Snitching

Criminal Informant Law, Policy, and Research

Threats to Informants

Los Angeles sheriffs hid FBI informant from the FBI

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Back in 2011, the FBI was investigating misconduct, abuse, and corruption in the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department headed by Sheriff Lee Baca and Under-Sheriff Paul Tanaka. During a medical transport, sheriffs discovered that one of the people in custody in the LA County jail, Anthony Brown, was acting as an FBI informant and reporting information about sheriff misconduct including the use of excessive force and bribery. In response, Tanaka oversaw a plan to hide Brown from the FBI. From the Los Angeles Magazine series on the scandal:

[In August, 2011], LASD management set into motion its most elaborate strategy: They would hide Brown from his FBI contacts, members of the U.S. Attorney’s office, and any other federal personnel who might try to find him until the inmate revealed to the LASD what he’d been telling the feds. Brown would be bounced into and out of various locations within the county jail system as LASD deputies used a byzantine stratagem of rebooking him every 48 hours under a new name, inmate number, and physical descriptors to game the system’s computer database so as to leave no digital bread crumbs. Finally, as part of their effort to get the inmate to disclose everything he knew, [the] team told Brown that he would not hear from the FBI again, that his handlers had abandoned him.

Baca and Tanaka were both eventually convicted of felony obstruction of justice in connection with the scandal. Brown received a $1 million settlement from the county for his civil rights lawsuit for abuse and failure to provide medical care.

Police found liable for young informant’s death

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In a relatively uncommon 2014 decision, the Supreme Court of Kentucky found Kentucky State police liable for the death of LeBron Gaither, an 18-year old informant, when police compromised his identity and then immediately used him again in a drug bust. Gaither v. Justice & Public Safety Cabinet, 447 S.W.3d 628 (Ky. 2014). The Court held that the law enforcement decision whether to use a “burned” informant is not discretionary but “ministerial,” writing that “the known rule . . . that forbade the re-use of a confidential informant after his cover was blown was absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific act arising from fixed and designated facts.” Or as the Board of Claims originally put it, “There is no discretion whether to use a burned informant again. It is simply not done….”

The case is notable for the ways it designates certain police decisions as non-discretionary when it comes to using informants, since under U.S. law so much of informant use and reward lies within the discretion of police and prosecutors.

The case was brought by Gaither’s grandmother, Virginia Gaither. For press coverage in the Kentucky Courier Journal, see “‘You can’t do this stuff’: Police finally pay up in blown-cover murder,” and “Court: Ky. police liable for informant’s murder.“

Gerald Shur, Architect of Witness Protection Program, Dies at 86

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Gerald Shur was a DOJ lawyer who started the federal witness security program (WITSEC) in 1970. The program elevated the use of high-profile informants and is widely credited with helping bring down the mafia. Shur co-authored a 2002 book “WITSEC: Inside the Federal Witness Protection Program” with the journalist Pete Earley. From the obituary in the New York Times:

“Mr. Shur had standards governing which witnesses got into the program: They had to have real evidence against someone of importance, and they had to be in real jeopardy if they agreed to provide it. ‘I guarantee you,’ Mr. Shur said in the 2007 interview, ‘that the kind of people we accept are ones where if the guy testified on Monday morning and didn’t get protection he would be dead Monday afternoon.’ The program has drawn its share of complaints, especially early on, when the number of participants grew quickly. Some of those given new identities complained of inadequate support or security in their new lives, or of trouble with paperwork. And sometimes, since many protected witnesses were lifelong criminals, they returned to their former lives.”

Georgia prison official loses his job for objecting to informant program

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The Atlanta Journal-Constitution reports that Georgia prison captain Sherman Maine was fired when he objected to a secret, off-the-books informant program being run in high security prisons in which informants were given cell phones.  From the story:

“Maine said the secrecy of the program makes it impossible to know if the reward is worth the risk. ‘Now every stabbing becomes suspect,’ said Maine, 45. ‘We won’t know who’s an informant or not. They’re going to get someone killed, if they haven’t already.’ . . .  Maine said [the program] reveals a lack of respect for human life while exposing the state to great liability. ‘They de-value human life to the point that it’s ridiculous,’ he said. ‘The state kept referring to (informants) as tools. They’re not tools, they’re people, and we have an obligation to protect them.’”

Maine is suing the Department of Corrections for violations of the Georgia Whistleblower Act.

The pressure to become an ICE informant

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The Intercept published this extensive story on the ICE informant program, how individual migrants can be coerced into becoming informants, and how the practice intersects with various aspects of the immigration apparatus: Play to Stay: Undocumented Immigrant Faces a Choice: Become an Informant for ICE or Be Deported.  The piece documents both the relatively robust regulatory structure that ICE uses to manage informants, and how it can go wrong.  From the article:

   “Working with confidential informants is a controlled process with oversight from [Homeland Security Investigations] HSI management, [Agent] Robinette said. Informants are registered and receive identification numbers. Background checks are conducted. Supervisors must approve the agreements. Indeed, ICE dedicates an entire handbook solely to informants, though its contents have not been made public. A separate HSI handbook on asset forfeiture, leaked to The Intercept and also published by the independent media organization Unicorn Riot, says that ICE should “identify, cultivate, and retain assistance” from so-called confidential informants “who are intimately involved with targeted criminal organizations.” According to the handbook, employing an informant should be a last resort, and the decision to do so should be made only after weighing the informant’s reliability against other factors. Every dollar paid to informants should be carefully considered and documented.

At the same time, ICE informant practices suffer from many of the ills that characterize informant use more generally and in less regulated environments. As the article notes, “several news stories have highlighted the pitfalls of ICE-informant relationships. Agents have fostered improper liaisons with informants. In one case, ICE knew an informant participated in killings yet continued working with him anyway (the agent was later fired). ICE, along with the FBI, uses informants and then works to deport them. ICE defenders like Robinette paint these as isolated incidents, and, of course, most ICE informants don’t make the news.”

For similar stories and additional resources see these prior posts.