Snitching

Criminal Informant Law, Policy, and Research

Immigration

“Snitch” visa often promised but rarely given

by

The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) produced this report “Shining a Light on the “S” Visa: A Long History of Unfulfilled Promises and Bureaucratic Red Tape.” An S-visa, sometimes referred to as a “snitch visa,” offers temporary residency status to immigrants who “are willing to supply…critical reliable information” to U.S. law enforcement. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(S).

The NACDL report reveals how often the government uses the S-visa to entice immigrants into becoming informants, sometimes at great risk to themselves and their families, even though almost none ever actually receive the visa. The phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the immigration relief “dangle.” See also this story from the Intercept: “Federal Informants are Often Promised Visas. They Rarely Materialize.”

FBI Agent reveals illegal informant tactics in the domestic war on terror

by

Informants are central to and embedded in numerous larger law enforcement programs. The New York Times Magazine published this profile of FBI agent Terry Albury who, among other things, pushed back against the FBI’s coercive development of informants in pursuit of baseless counterterrorism investigations, as well as racial and religious profiling. Albury was convicted in 2018 of leaking classified documents to journalists; he was sentenced to four years in prison. From the article, “I Helped Destroy People“:

“Assessments were the opening salvo to the informant-recruitment process. It was a delicate art of manipulation, persuading a person to work for the federal government against his or her own community, but with access to the person’s criminal history, or immigration status, it was much easier. There were different techniques agents were allowed to use. They could assist a person who lacked legal status to be given it, a tactic known as the “immigration-relief dangle.” Conversely, agents could also work with immigration officials to deport those people if and when they’d exhausted their usefulness as confidential sources. Fear was a prominent driver. . . . Another approach was to threaten uncooperative sources with spreading disinformation unless they agreed to cooperate. “The script was, ‘Everyone in your community already thinks you’re a source, so you might as well work with us.'” “

Assessing terrorism informants 20 years after 9/11

by

NYTimes story covering the prosecution of an alleged terrorist who was set up by a paid government informant: The ‘Herald Square Bomber’ Who Wasn’t. Nearly 50 percent of international terrorism cases have involved informants, in a process that has drawn criticism for decades. From the article:

“In [terrorism] trials, the government presented evidence gathered by paid civilian informants who latched onto low-income, vulnerable and mentally challenged individuals, urged them toward a plot and, in several cases, even offered money and supplies to carry out bombings.”

See here for previous posts on terror-related informant policies.

The pressure to become an ICE informant

by

The Intercept published this extensive story on the ICE informant program, how individual migrants can be coerced into becoming informants, and how the practice intersects with various aspects of the immigration apparatus: Play to Stay: Undocumented Immigrant Faces a Choice: Become an Informant for ICE or Be Deported.  The piece documents both the relatively robust regulatory structure that ICE uses to manage informants, and how it can go wrong.  From the article:

   “Working with confidential informants is a controlled process with oversight from [Homeland Security Investigations] HSI management, [Agent] Robinette said. Informants are registered and receive identification numbers. Background checks are conducted. Supervisors must approve the agreements. Indeed, ICE dedicates an entire handbook solely to informants, though its contents have not been made public. A separate HSI handbook on asset forfeiture, leaked to The Intercept and also published by the independent media organization Unicorn Riot, says that ICE should “identify, cultivate, and retain assistance” from so-called confidential informants “who are intimately involved with targeted criminal organizations.” According to the handbook, employing an informant should be a last resort, and the decision to do so should be made only after weighing the informant’s reliability against other factors. Every dollar paid to informants should be carefully considered and documented.

At the same time, ICE informant practices suffer from many of the ills that characterize informant use more generally and in less regulated environments. As the article notes, “several news stories have highlighted the pitfalls of ICE-informant relationships. Agents have fostered improper liaisons with informants. In one case, ICE knew an informant participated in killings yet continued working with him anyway (the agent was later fired). ICE, along with the FBI, uses informants and then works to deport them. ICE defenders like Robinette paint these as isolated incidents, and, of course, most ICE informants don’t make the news.”

For similar stories and additional resources see these prior posts.

Coercion of Intelligence Informants

by

Diala Shamas, staff attorney at the Center for Constitutional Rights, has just published this informative article in the Brooklyn Law Review: A Nation of Informants: Reigning In Post-9/11 Coercion of Intelligence Informants.  Here is the abstract:

“This article challenges the adequacy of the existing legal and regulatory framework governing informant recruitment and coercion practices to protect fundamental rights, informed by the Muslim-American experience. It looks at the growing law enforcement practice of recruiting informants among Muslim-American communities for intelligence gathering purposes. Although the coercion of law-abiding individuals to provide information to federal law enforcement agencies for intelligence gathering purposes implicates significant rights, it is left unregulated. Existing, albeit limited, restraints on the government agents’ ability to coerce individuals to provide information either assume a criminal context, or are driven by historical concerns over FBI corruption. As the U.S. government engages in widespread surveillance of Muslim-American communities, it relies heavily on recruiting members of those communities as informants. These individuals are targeted for their community ties, or their religious or linguistic knowledge—and not because of any nexus they might have to criminal activity. This has led FBI agents to search for coercive levers outside of the criminal process and that have far fewer procedural protections—namely, immigration and watch-listing authorities. Thus, existing protections that have evolved to prevent civil rights violations in the criminal informant context—limited as those protections may be—do not apply. In light of these expanding authorities and the significant rights at stake, this article makes several proposals that would regulate the recruitment of intelligence informants.”