More civil cases in which families have sued police for harm to their children who were working as informants. The cases are collected in this blog post from Professor Jeff Welty, Professor of Public Law & Government at the University of North Carolina; the post also includes several North Carolina police department policies on using children as informants. For more on the topic, see these previous posts.
Police
10th Circuit case could shake the foundations of snitching
In Mendenhall v. Denver, the plaintiff is making an argument about search warrants that could completely change the informant landscape. Police got a warrant to search Michael Mendenhall’s house based on hearsay, which is to say, by repeating something that somebody else said. Mendenhall is represented by the Institute for Justice, and his attorneys are arguing that the warrant violated the plain text of the Fourth Amendment which requires that all warrants be “supported by oath or affirmation.” Since the officer swearing out the warrant had no firsthand knowledge, the argument goes, he could not properly swear to the facts in his affidavit. For this argument to prevail, the Supreme Court would have to overturn Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), which permitted the issuance of a warrant based on hearsay allegations from an informant. If Mendenhall prevails, police could no longer rely on assertions from confidential informants in order to get warrants. Since the majority of warrants, and the vast majority of drug warrants, rely on informants, this would be a massive change in the law.
Here is a Reason Magazine piece on the case; amicus briefs from law professors and civil rights attorneys can be found on the IFJ page. And here is a law review article by Professor Laurent Sacharoff that explains the historical argument: “The Broken Fourth Amendment Oath,” 74 Stanford Law Review 603 (2022).
Refusing to snitch
The Marshall Project has published this remarkable story about George Hall who refused to serve as a jailhouse informant against David Wood. David Wood is on death row and is scheduled to be executed next month in Texas.
Hall, Wood, and two other men were all incarcerated together back in 1990. According to Hall, Hall and the two other men were offered deals by Texas law enforcement to testify falsely against Wood. Hall refused; the other men agreed and helped convict Wood. From the story:
“As Hall tells it, several El Paso detectives took the three men, without handcuffs, to a hamburger joint and a police station, seating them in a room with photographs of the victims, a large coffee pot, cigarettes and snacks. They handed the men case files with crime scene photos and interview notes with other witnesses, Hall said. “David Wood is our suspect,” he recalls the detectives saying. “It’d be best if you tell us something, because we can’t let this guy walk.” Plus, there was reward money for people who helped them.”
Stories like Hall’s are rare for a number of reasons. The government only rewards inculpatory evidence — evidence that builds the state’s cases and makes defendants look guilty — not evidence that might help exonerate a defendant. Conversely, defendants can’t offer leniency at all, and offering money or a reward looks like witness tampering. Which means that all the incentives run in one direction, towards snitching for the prosecution and away from contradicting the government’s story. When someone like Hall refuses to snitch, moreover, they will not be called as a witness by the government, which means the defense might never learn about them. And coming forward like Hall did can be risky for people facing their own criminal cases: they run the risk of law enforcement disfavor or even retaliation. (This reality sits in considerable tension with the Second Circuit’s holding that prisoners have a First Amendment right against being forced to act as an informant.)
For all these kinds of reasons, when people refuse to snitch, we are unlikely to learn about it, which makes this particular story even more revealing. Story here: He Refused to Become a Jailhouse Snitch. Can He Stop David Wood’s Execution?
Los Angeles sheriffs hid FBI informant from the FBI
Back in 2011, the FBI was investigating misconduct, abuse, and corruption in the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department headed by Sheriff Lee Baca and Under-Sheriff Paul Tanaka. During a medical transport, sheriffs discovered that one of the people in custody in the LA County jail, Anthony Brown, was acting as an FBI informant and reporting information about sheriff misconduct including the use of excessive force and bribery. In response, Tanaka oversaw a plan to hide Brown from the FBI. From the Los Angeles Magazine series on the scandal:
[In August, 2011], LASD management set into motion its most elaborate strategy: They would hide Brown from his FBI contacts, members of the U.S. Attorney’s office, and any other federal personnel who might try to find him until the inmate revealed to the LASD what he’d been telling the feds. Brown would be bounced into and out of various locations within the county jail system as LASD deputies used a byzantine stratagem of rebooking him every 48 hours under a new name, inmate number, and physical descriptors to game the system’s computer database so as to leave no digital bread crumbs. Finally, as part of their effort to get the inmate to disclose everything he knew, [the] team told Brown that he would not hear from the FBI again, that his handlers had abandoned him.
Baca and Tanaka were both eventually convicted of felony obstruction of justice in connection with the scandal. Brown received a $1 million settlement from the county for his civil rights lawsuit for abuse and failure to provide medical care.
Police found liable for young informant’s death
In a relatively uncommon 2014 decision, the Supreme Court of Kentucky found Kentucky State police liable for the death of LeBron Gaither, an 18-year old informant, when police compromised his identity and then immediately used him again in a drug bust. Gaither v. Justice & Public Safety Cabinet, 447 S.W.3d 628 (Ky. 2014). The Court held that the law enforcement decision whether to use a “burned” informant is not discretionary but “ministerial,” writing that “the known rule . . . that forbade the re-use of a confidential informant after his cover was blown was absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific act arising from fixed and designated facts.” Or as the Board of Claims originally put it, “There is no discretion whether to use a burned informant again. It is simply not done….”
The case is notable for the ways it designates certain police decisions as non-discretionary when it comes to using informants, since under U.S. law so much of informant use and reward lies within the discretion of police and prosecutors.
The case was brought by Gaither’s grandmother, Virginia Gaither. For press coverage in the Kentucky Courier Journal, see “‘You can’t do this stuff’: Police finally pay up in blown-cover murder,” and “Court: Ky. police liable for informant’s murder.“