Snitching

Criminal Informant Law, Policy, and Research

Incentives & Payments

DOJ audit of DEA confidential source program

by

The U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General has just released this audit of the DEA’s Confidential Source Program.  In a rare glimpse into the scope and scale of informant deployment, the audit states: “Between October 1, 2010, and September 30, 2015, the DEA had over 18,000 active confidential sources assigned to its domestic offices, with over 9,000 of those sources receiving approximately $237 million in payments.”

The audit was critical of the DEA. Here are a few excerpts:

  • “[W]hile DEA policy prohibits paying deactivated sources who were deactivated because of an arrest warrant or for committing a serious offense, we found two concerning instances of payments to previously-deactivated sources. In one case, the DEA reactivated a confidential source who previously provided false testimony in trials and depositions. During the approximate 5-year period of reactivation, this source was used by 13 DEA field offices and paid $469,158. More than $61,000 of the $469,158 was paid after this source was once again deactivated for making false statements to a prosecutor. . . .  [W]e estimated the DEA may have paid about $9.4 million to more than 800 deactivated sources between fiscal years (FY) 2011 and 2015.”

  • “[W]e were extremely concerned to discover the DEA condoned its confidential sources’ use of “sub-sources,” who are individuals a source recruits and pays to perform activities or provide information related to the source’s work for the DEA. During our review of DEA files, we found evidence of sources who were paid based, in part, on the need to pay “sub-sources,” but the information in the files was insufficient to allow us to determine the full extent of such payments.”
  • “[W]hen we asked the DEA Intelligence Division to provide us with an itemized list and overall total of payments to intelligence-related confidential sources, it was unable to do so. We reviewed DEA records and estimated that, during the 5-year period of our review, the Intelligence Division paid more than $30 million to sources who provided narcotics-related intelligence and contributed to law enforcement operations, $25 million of which went to just 9 sources. Additionally, we identified one source who was paid over $30 million during a 30-year period, some of it in cash payments of more than $400,000. We concluded the Intelligence Division’s management and oversight of its sources was not commensurate with the large amount of payments it made to them.”

U.S. DOJ criticizes DEA informant program

by

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the U.S. Department of Justice has just released this report, Audit of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Confidential Source Policies and Oversight of Higher-Risk Confidential Sources.

This is an important report for a number of reasons.  The press and the public have had trouble getting basic information from the DEA about its informant policies and usage: this audit fills in some of those informational gaps. The audit identifies numerous troubling practices within the DEA and offers new insights into the kinds of risks that are routinely run by federal officials who rely on criminal informants.  The audit also strengthens the case for a pending bill in Congress entitled “The Confidential Informant Accountability Act,” H.R. 2985, introduced by Rep. Stephen Lynch (D-MA). That bill would require the DEA, along with the FBI and other federal investigative agencies, to report to Congress the serious crimes committed by their informants, as well as their payments and rewards.  As described in greater detail below, the OIG found that the DEA was seriously deficient in documenting and controlling the crimes committed by its informants.

Highlights of the Report:

1. The DEA resisted the audit.  As the report put it, “the DEA has seriously impeded the OIG’s audit process, which has affected our ability to conduct a timely, full, and effective review of the DEA’s Confidential Source Program. The DEA made attempts to prohibit the OIG’s observation of confidential source file reviews and delayed, for months at a time, the provision of confidential source information and documentation.”  The audit is therefore ongoing.  This resistance to oversight is consistent with the general culture of secrecy surrounding informant use, in which law enforcement is often resistant to disclosing its practices, even to its own direct supervisors. See, for example, this post.

2. The DEA permits its informants to deal drugs and commit other crimes without adequate supervision or oversight.  The U.S. DOJ has guidelines for its investigative agencies that require certain procedures before an informant can be authorized to commit a crime.  The DOJ Guidelines, which are here, distinguish between Tier One and Tier Two Otherwise Illegal Activity (OIA).  Tier One OIA includes very serious offenses and requires authorization from agency supervisors and a prosecutor.

The DEA does not follow these guidelines.  For example, the DEA explicitly excludes “the purchase of drugs or other undercover activities that are routinely performed by DEA Agents and CSs [confidential sources] during the normal course of their duties” from the kinds of “sensitive activities” that require supervisory approval within the DEA.  The only drug transactions for which the DEA rules require a prosecutor’s approval are those involving amounts under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 2D1.1(c)(1), which are the highest amounts documented in the guidelines, and include 90 KG or more of heroin, 450 KG or more of cocaine; 25.2 KG or more of cocaine base (crack); 90 KG or more of PCP; and 45 KG or more of Methamphetamine.  Amounts less than this do not require prosecutorial approval.  The report concludes:

“We believe the DEA’s policies do not adequately address the concerns and risks involved in authorizing confidential sources to conduct and participate in OIA and do not correspond to the AG Guidelines’ requirements in place to mitigate these risks….DEA confidential sources could engage in illegal activity that has not been adequately considered, or become involved in additional illegal activities beyond those that have been considered with the mistaken belief that they are doing so with the authorization of the DEA. Further, an ill-considered or unclear decision to authorize a confidential source to engage in OIA may create significant difficulties in prosecuting the source or co-conspirators on charges related to the source’s activities.”

3. The DEA rarely reviews the relationships between its agents and their long-term informants (over six years), and when they do, the review is cursory.  This is historically and famously problematic: the DOJ Guidelines were themselves a direct response to the FBI’s disastrous long-term relationships with its mafia informants.

4. The DEA pays some of its informants death and disability benefits when they are injured or killed in connection with their informant activities.

Ex-traffickers rewarded for “El Chapo” indictment

by

In a dynamic reminiscent of the FBI’s use of mafia informants, two major drug traffickers were given drastically reduced sentences in exchange for their cooperation against the Mexican Sinaloa cartel.  The two men reportedly smuggled $1.8 billion worth of drugs into Mexico and were facing life sentences; they have been cooperating with the U.S. government for six years.  From the Huffington Post:

“[A] federal prosecutor [] poured praise on Pedro and Margarito Flores, portraying them as among the most valuable traffickers-turned-informants in U.S. history and describing the courage they displayed in gathering evidence against Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman and other leaders in Mexico’s Sinaloa cartel. With credit for time served awaiting sentencing and for good behavior in prison, the brothers, now 33, could be out in as little as six years.”

Denver Post examines costs and benefits of informant use

by

The Denver Post ran this three-part in depth series on informant use: How police reliance on confidential informants in Colorado carries risk, Some want harsher laws for confidential informants in Colorado, and Colorado gang slaying by ATF informant shows perils of informant use.

The series documents a large number of convictions obtained through informant use, including important evidence against violent gangs.  It also reveals wrongful convictions, an ACLU lawsuit, tens of thousands of dollars paid to informants, and the continuing violent crimes committed by some informants while they were working for the federal government.

Jailed Mexican mafia snitches receive $150,000 and leniency

by

From the Orange County Register: Money, cable TV, food delivery: How Mexican Mafia snitches lived like kings behind bars.  Here are a few excerpts:

“As two of the most prolific jailhouse informants in Orange and Los Angeles counties, Raymond Cuevas and Jose Paredes befriended suspects in jail and collected information in more than 30 criminal cases, according to a spreadsheet assembled by prosecutors. …For their efforts, Cuevas and Peredes received more than $150,000 from local law enforcement agencies during an 18-month period ending in March, records show.

The pair enjoyed other perks, too, including cable TV in their cells and Del Taco food delivered by officers. Cuevas and Paredes also received leniency on criminal charges that could have sent them to prison for life, according to court transcripts and other records.

Thirty-nine-year-old Cuevas, known as “Puppet,” was arrested four times for armed robbery. His last arrest was on charges of possessing a loaded weapon, a possible third strike that could have sent him to prison for life. Instead, the informant received a deal that allowed him to plead no contest in 2013; he received credit for five years already served but no prison sentence.

For several years, Cuevas was the shot-caller for Latino inmates at Los Angeles’ North County Correctional Facility, according to a ruling from the Second District Court of Appeal. On one occasion, he informed his deputy handler that he had just ordered a knife attack on another inmate as part of a jail turf war, the ruling stated. No action was taken by Los Angeles County deputies to prevent the attack, which left the inmate seriously wounded, the ruling said.  Cuevas was not prosecuted for the attack, but two inmates who carried out the order were convicted, according to the appellate ruling.”