Snitching

Criminal Informant Law, Policy, and Research

Reliability

Texas considers banning informant testimony in capital cases

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Several states are considering new legislation to regulate informant use.  In Texas, HB 564 would ban the use of compensated criminal witnesses in death penalty cases altogether.  The bill provides that the “testimony of an informant or of an alleged accomplice of the defendant is not admissible if the testimony is given in exchange for a grant or promise by the attorney representing the state or by another of immunity from prosecution, reduction of sentence, or any other form of leniency or special treatment.”  Full story at The Intercept here.  Radley Balko at the Washington Post calls the bill a “significant first step” in recognizing the inherent unreliability of informants.  As Balko, who has written about informant debacles before, puts it:

“The whole concept of jailhouse informants defies credulity. The very idea that people regularly confess to crimes that could put them in prison for decades or possibly even get them executed to someone they just met in a jail cell and have known for all of a few hours is and has always been preposterous. Not to mention the fact that these are people whose word prosecutors wouldn’t trust under just about any other circumstance.”

In North Carolina, HB 700–which did not pass–would have created comprehensive regulation of jailhouse informants, including corroboration requirements, enhanced discovery, jury instructions, and data collection.  Story here.  An interesting feature of this bill was that it would have created a “rebuttable presumption of inadmissibility,” placing the burden on the government to show that these risky witnesses should nevertheless be permitted to testify.

Florida Supreme Court regulates criminal informant testimony

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In 2012, the Florida Innocence Commission made a series of reform recommendations in recognition of the “dangers of false informant and jailhouse snitch testimony.” The Florida Supreme Court has now amended the rules of evidence to reflect those recommendations. See In re: Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.220. The Miami Herald reported the story here: Florida’s high court puts brakes on snitches’ testimony.

The Florida Supreme Court . . . finally has changed the rules of evidence. Beginning this month, prosecutors now are required to disclose both a summary of the jailhouse informant’s criminal history and just what kind of deal a snitch will be getting in return for testimony. And now, jurors will hear about prior cases that relied on testimony from that particular informant. The justices ordered new restrictions on the much abused informant testimony, because snitches, the court noted, “constitute the basis for many wrongful convictions.” It was an unanimous decision. It was about time.

The new rules require greater disclosure of an informant’s criminal background, prior history of providing information to the government, and all their deals. Of particular importance, the Florida court included all informants who allege that they have evidence about defendant statements, not merely “jailhouse snitches,” i.e., those who happen to be in jail at the time. The new rule also requires disclosure of benefits that the informant “expects to receive” for his testimony, and it defines benefits broadly as “anything…[including any] personal advantage, vindication, or other benefit that the prosecution, or any person acting on behalf of the prosecution, has knowingly made or may make in the future.” This is an important counter to the fact that informants know that they are likely to be rewarded for providing information even if no one explicitly promises them anything up front. Thanks to EvidenceProfBlog for calling attention to this important development.

Jailhouse snitches pay $1000s for information

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USA Today ran this indepth story about a pay-for-information scheme in the Atlanta jail, in which federal inmates looking for cooperation credit bought information to pass on to their handlers, passing it off as their own knowledge. Story here: Federal prisoners use snitching for personal gain. The story offers an unusually detailed and extensive look at the ways that inmates and informants can game the system, buying and selling information that prosecutors and investigators then reward them for and rely on. In this black market free-for-all, inmates paid tens of thousands of dollars ($250,000 in one case) for information to lower their sentences, while FBI agents relied on snitches who were passing on second-hand uncorroborated information from the street. It is the fourth such scheme uncovered in Atlanta alone in the last 20 years.

A similar pay-for-information scheme was discovered in a federal prison in Louisiana, after Ann Colomb and her three sons were wrongfully convicted based on the testimony of dozens of snitch inmates. See this post: Professional Prison Snitch Ring.

New informant legislation introduced in Texas

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A Texas legislator has just introduced a new bill, H.B. 189, that would bar the use of compensated criminal informants in capital cases. H.B. 189 would make informant and accomplice testimony inadmissible if “the testimony is given in exchange for a grant or promise by the attorney representing the state or by another of immunity from prosecution, reduction of sentence, or any other form of leniency or special treatment.” In effect, the bill embodies the sensible idea that paying criminals for their testimony is simply too unreliable to be used in death penalty cases. The Texas Tribune ran this story: Bill Would Restrict Informant Testimony in Death Cases. The bill would also bar the use of alleged confessions made to jailhouse snitches unless the confessions are corroborated by electronic recordings. In many ways Texas has been on the forefront of this issue–the state already has drug and jailhouse snitch corroboration requirements. See this post: Texas requires corroboration for informant witnesses.

Supreme Court begins debating informant unreliability

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The Supreme Court released an order today denying certiorari in Cash v. Maxwell, formerly Maxwell v. Roe, an important Ninth Circuit decision discussed in this previous post. Usually the Court does not explain cert denials, but this case generated a heated debate between Justice Sotomayor, who supported the denial, and Justices Scalia and Alito who thought the Ninth Circuit’s decision should have been overturned. See SCOTUSblog post here, and L.A. Times story here.

Today’s decision is important for a number of reasons. First, it shows that the Justices have joined numerous state and federal legislators in recognizing the problem of informant unreliability. Informant-based wrongful convictions are increasingly frequent in the courts and in the news, and many states have taken up the issue. See Legislation Section of the main website. Although the Court did not answer the question today, it’s a sign of the times that the Justices are arguing about it.

Maxwell also shows how the legal debate over informant use is becoming less about procedure and more about substantive questions of reliability and innocence. Until recently, most informant litigation has been a fight over disclosure: the information that the government must disclose regarding its use of compensated criminal witnesses. The Maxwell case and the Sotomayor/Scalia debate squarely confront the substantive question of unreliability: how unreliable can compensated criminal witnesses be before the law restricts their use? Or to put it another way, how high is our tolerance for the likelihood of wrongful conviction? Even Justice Scalia concluded that the informant in Maxwell’s case was a “habitual liar,” and that there were reasons “to think it likely that he testified falsely” at Maxwell’s trial. The Ninth Circuit took the next step, holding that the Due Process Clause does not permit such clearly unreliable evidence to be used. As a result of today’s cert denial, this holding stands.

Finally, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the Ninth Circuit relied on “an avalanche of evidence” that the informant in that case was unreliable. The existence of such evidentiary avalanches is a relatively new phenomenon. Thanks to the innocence movement and numerous new studies (see Resources & Scholarship section on the main website), courts and litigators have more evidence than ever before regarding the unreliability of criminal informants. These new data will surely change how courts consider such questions in the future.