The Kansas Death Penalty Defense Unit recently filed this motion asking the court to take protective measures to prevent jailhouse snitches from being created in the case of Kansas v. Adam Longoria. Asserting that “Mr. Longoria has no intention of talking to anyone but his attorneys about the facts of this case,” the motion requests that the court “take measures to ensure that no jailhouse snitches or other suspect informants are created in this case to manufacture evidence for the state.” This proactive defense tactic appears to be getting more common (see previous post: Interesting effort to preempt jailhouse snitching).
Jailhouse Informants
Interesting effort to preempt jailhouse snitching
Since everyone in the criminal system knows that high-profile murder suspects are prime targets for jailhouse snitches, why not try to nip it in the bud? That’s what one Arizona public defender tried to do, asking the judge to keep other inmates away from his client Pamela Phillips if those other inmates were also represented by the public defender’s office. Were such inmates to come forward as snitch witnesses, it would create a conflict and the public defender’s office could no longer represent Phillips. Story here: Pre-emptive anti-snitch move fails. The judge denied the motion, but its a good example of proactive lawyering that builds on our growing knowledge of how jailhouse informants operate.
Another jailhouse snitch drives a homicide investigation
Today’s Akron Beacon Journal reports on new developments in the Neal Rankin murder case: “DNA results may give inmate a new trial.” The police had a lot of trouble identifying a suspect back in 1993–according to the commander of the homicide unit, they had “45 suspects the first day,” and murder charges were brought and then dropped against several defendants. Finally, over a year after the murder, the government charged Dewey Amos Jones with the crime based on an allegation from a jaihouse snitch that Jones had confessed to him. I include the story not only because it is yet another example of a shaky case built on compensated snitch testimony, but because it illustrates how powerful an informant’s allegations can be. Here, a jailhouse snitch got authorities to focus on Jones long after the crime, and without any direct evidence of his guilt. Jones is represented by the Ohio Innocence Project.
Snitches bolster weak cases
The most egregious cases of informant unreliability occur where an entire case turns on the testimony of a single compensated snitch. The dangers of wrongful conviction in this scenario are so obvious that numerous states have or are considering corroboration requirements. But informant testimony can produce wrongful convictions in another way, and that is by making weak cases look stronger than they are. For example, Florida Today ran a story last week (updated link) on the probable innocence of Gary Bennett. Bennett was convicted based on a now-discredited dog sniff expert and the testimony of a jailhouse snitch. Similarly, in the high profile case of Cameron Todd Willingham, the Texas man was convicted and executed for arson based on a combination of poor forensic science and the testimony of a jailhouse snitch who later recanted. See previous post.
Such cases are not accidents. Jailhouse snitches are infamous for fabricating information about homicide and other high-profile cases, and offering the information to law enforcement without any solicitations or promises on the part of the government. In other words, the very existence of the case generates the bad evidence because of the general expectation in the offender population that such information will eventually be rewarded. This snitch testimony, however, makes the original case look stronger than it really is. This problem cannot be solved by corroboration requirements, since the informant’s information is automatically “corroborated” by the pre-existing weak evidence. Yet another reason to restrict the use of jailhouse informant testimony.
48 Hours report on killer FBI informant
CBS/48 Hours ran this special investigative report on serial killer-FBI informant Scott Kimball. Kimball–a long-time felon–was sharing a prison cell and saw a photo of his cellmate’s girlfriend, Jennifer Marcum. Kimball concocted a story about a murder-for-hire scheme in order to secure his own release, and then–while working for the FBI as an informant–proceeded to murder Marcum and at least two other women. When Marcum’s parents approached the FBI with their suspicions, Kimball’s FBI handler dismissed them. This dynamic is one of the major dangers of informant reliance: not only was Kimball able to use his status as a jailhouse snitch to gain release based on fabricated evidence, but his snitch status and relationship with the government protected him, at least initially, from investigation.
This story reveals, among other things, that there are no clear lines between jailhouse snitches and working informants–one can morph into another and, all too often, take the government along for the ride. This fact should influence those states–including California, Illinois, and Texas, to name but a few– that are considering jailhouse snitch reforms. The same concerns about unreliability and criminal conduct are present whenever any criminal informant–in or out of jail–trades information in order to escape punishment for his own crimes.