Snitching

Criminal Informant Law, Policy, and Research

Drug-related

Miami New Times series on juvenile informant

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Enriquez Bosco was 15 years old when he became an informant for the police, providing information against one of Miami’s most notorious gangs. This three-part series in the Miami New Times documents Bosco’s travails–including drug addition, rape, and ultimately deportation–from which his handlers failed to protect him and in some cases, may have brought on. From Part 2 of the story:

Enriquez’s story begins and ends in Nicaragua, where he was exiled this past June. Though he had cooperated with Miami police to bust as many as 30 gang members — including leaders of the infamous International Posse — authorities allowed him to be beaten, raped, and exiled to the country of his birth with barely a mention of his service. His crime: a guilty plea to possessing traces of cocaine, a third-degree felony that required two days in jail. It resulted from a long-ago drug habit that started when police employed him to make a drug buy.

Juvenile informants often incur terrible risks with little or no protection from the legal system. For an indepth look at the phenomenon, see Andrea Dennis, “Collateral Damage? Juvenile Snitches in America’s Wars on Drugs, Crime and Gangs,” 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1145 (2009).

Mexican cartel informant testifies in Texas

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Here’s an unusually detailed glimpse into the activities of a Mexican informant who was part of the Zetas cartel while working for the DEA: Snitch tells of spying on Zetas. It’s unusual in part because of the generally secretive nature of informant use, but also more concretely because trials are infrequent and therefore informants rarely testify. On the extent to which informant/cartel members have become central to U.S. law enforcement in Mexico, see this previous post: NYT: Numerous Mexican drug informants benefit U.S. law enforcement.

NYT: Numerous Mexican drug informants benefit U.S. law enforcement

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The New York Times features a story this week on the expanding recruitment and use of Mexican drug informants: U.S. Agencies Infiltrating Drug Cartels Across Mexico. The story describes American law enforcement as having “significantly built up networks of Mexican informants” and focuses on the substantial benefits that such criminal informants can provide. For example:

Informants have helped Mexican authorities capture or kill about two dozen high-ranking and midlevel drug traffickers, and sometimes have given American counternarcotics agents access to the top leaders of the cartels they are trying to dismantle.

The U.S. also learned of a plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador through one of those DEA-developed informants. See Huffington Post: Iran Plot to Assassinate Saudi Ambassador Foiled by DOJ Sting.
The Times story notes that informants can also give rise to “complicated ethical issues,” including the fact that informants are typically working off their own crimes. Last year, NPR and Primetime ran stories illustrating the serious criminality that such informants may engage in, even while working for the government: NPR series on House of Death informant and Primetime: U.S. Customs authorizes informant to import cocaine.

MS-13 informant convicted of lying to prosecutors

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Follow up to this post: A Rat’s Life: MS-13 Informants Run Wild. In a rare turnaround, the government has prosecuted its own informant for lying to prosecutors about murders he previously committed. Roberto Acosta now faces up to five years; he argues that he was the government’s main source for its case against MS-13 and without him they wouldn’t have been able to get the numerous convictions they did. SF Weekly blog postings here: Feds Want Maximum Prison Time for Roberto Acosta, MS-13 Informant Who Lied and Roberto Acosta, MS-13 Informant Convicted of Lying, Wants Out of Jail

9th Circuit clarifies DEA disclosure obligations under FOIA

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The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) empowers individual requestors to compel the government to disclose its records. Various exceptions permit the government to withhold certain records regarding informants, but the Ninth Circuit recently explained some limits to those exceptions. In Pickard v. Dep’t of Justice, 2011 WL 3134505 (9th Cir., July 27, 2011), William Pickard filed a FOIA request with the DEA to get records regarding Gordon Todd Skinner, a DEA informant. The DEA denied his request by submitting a so-called “Glomar response” in which it neither officially confirmed nor denied the existence of Skinner as an informant. The 9th Circuit held that the DEA in effect had already “officially confirmed” Skinner as a confidential informant by eliciting testimony about and from him in open court at Pickard’s trial, and that therefore the DEA could not avoid the FOIA request in that manner. In other words, once the government relies on an informant–either through an agent’s testimony at trial regarding that informant or by using the informant as a witness–it cannot subsequently block a FOIA request by refusing to acknowledge the existence of the informant. This does not mean that the DEA necessarily has to produce records regarding its informants; it does mean, however, that it has to acknowledge the existence of such records and identify the specific FOIA exceptions that might permit nondisclosure.

This is an important decision for a number of reasons. As Judge Wallace explains in his concurrence, “the specific circumstances pursuant to which an informant’s status is deemed “officially confirmed” is a matter of first impression and great importance.” This is because the threshold question of whether a person is an informant at all may be a secret. Moreover, the decision clarifies that once the government decides to use an informant or his information at trial, it relinquishes much of its claim to confidentiality under FOIA. As Judge Wallace put it:

On the one hand, prosecutors frequently must rely on informants, who possess vital information, to prosecute dangerous criminals. On the other hand, the DEA and confidential informants have a different interest in secrecy and privacy than federal prosecutors. Yet, under the majority holding, an Assistant United States Attorney can eliminate that privacy interest by asking a single question–i.e., “Did you serve as a confidential informant”–in open court.