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New ABA opinion on prosecutorial duty to disclose information

August 26, 2009 by Alexandra Natapoff

The American Bar Association just released an important new opinion regarding the prosecutorial ethical duty to disclose evidence and information favorable to the defense. The rule itself requires prosecutors to “make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense.” The opinion interprets this ethical mandate very broadly: it is more demanding than constitutional Brady disclosure requirements; it covers all information favorable to the defense, not just evidence; it is up to the defense, not the prosecution, to evaluate the utility of the information; the government must disclose information as soon as is reasonably practical, and the defendant cannot waive these rights or absolve the prosecutor of her disclosure duties. Here are a few key excerpts:

Rule 3.8(d) is more demanding than the constitutional case law in that it requires the disclosure of evidence or information favorable to the defense without regard to the anticipated impact of the evidence or information on a trial’s outcome. . . .The rule requires prosecutors to disclose favorable evidence so that the defense can decide on its utility.

The ethical duty of disclosure is not limited to admissible ‘evidence’ . . .; it also requires disclosure of favorable ‘information’. Though possibly inadmissible itself, favorable information may lead a defendant’s lawyer to admissible testimony or other evidence or assist him [sic] in other ways, such as in plea negotiations.

For the disclosure of information to be timely, it must be made early enough that the information can be used effectively. . . . Once known to the prosecutor, [evidence and information] must be disclosed under Rule 3.8(d) as soon as reasonably practical. . . Among the most significant purposes for which disclosure must be made under Rule 3.8(d) is to enable defense counsel to advise the defendant regarding whether to plead guilty.

Where early disclosure, or disclosure of too much information, may undermine an ongoing investigation or jeopardize a witness, as may be the case when an informant’s identity would be revealed, the prosecutor may seek a protective order.

This is an extremely important opinion for informant law and practice, for several reasons…(more after the break)

First is that a great deal of snitch litigation involves so-called Brady or Giglio claims (see this previous post), in which it is alleged that the prosecution withheld information from the defense about snitch witnesses. The ABA opinion not only reiterates the importance of prosecutorial disclosure generally, but explains that the prosecutor’s ethical obligation to hand over favorable information is broader than her constitutional obligation. In other words, even if the Constitution does not require disclosure, the prosecutor has an independent professional duty to disclose. While the violation of this duty will not invalidate a conviction, it could lead to professional discipline or firing.

Another interesting feature of the opinion is that prosecutorial supervisors must “establish procedures to ensure that the prosecutor responsible for making disclosure obtains evidence and information that must be disclosed.” This includes keeping track of information in one case that might need to be disclosed by a different prosecutor in another case. In other words, prosecutor offices must have data collection and dissemination mechanisms by which their employees can comply with their ethical obligations. This position contrasts with the recent Supreme Court decision in Van de Kamp v. Goldstein this year, in which the Court held that prosecutorial supervisors could not be sued for failing to create data collection systems to provide informant-related impeachment material to defendants. While under Van de Kamp a chief prosecutor cannot be sued for the office’s lack of disclosure procedures, under the ABA opinion she could be disciplined.

In effect, the ABA has decided that the Supreme Court’s decisions on prosecutorial disclosure are too weak, ethically speaking, and that prosecutors and their supervisors have far stronger professional obligations to disclose information to defendants, including information about government informants.

Ethical obligations are a crucial feature of the legal profession–attorneys can be disciplined, fired, or disbarred if they violate the ethical rules of their jurisdiction. Disclosure obligations are likewise central to prosecutorial integrity. Attorney General Eric Holder recently threw out the corruption case against Alaska Senator Ted Stevens because Holder concluded that DOJ lawyers violated their obligation to disclose information to the defense. NPR story here. Insofar as states and prosecutors take this new ABA directive seriously, it could be a powerful engine for increased disclosure and transparency.

On a more technical note (non-lawyers may want to tune out here), the opinion does not explicitly address a constitutional issue raised by the Supreme Court in Ruiz. The Ruiz Court distinguished between exculpatory Brady material–material that directly pertains to the defendant’s guilt or innocence–and exculpatory Giglio impeachment material–material suggesting that the state’s witness is lying. Classic Giglio includes information about informant rewards, the informant’s criminal record, prior history of cooperation or falsehoods, or anything that would impeach the informant’s credibility. The Ruiz Court held that although Giglio material is a form of Brady material, the government can withhold that information from defendants prior to the entry of a plea, although not prior to trial. The ABA opinion makes clear, however, that prosecutors cannot wait for trial, but have to disclose information early enough so that defendants can use it meaningfully during plea negotiations.

The question is therefore whether Rule 3.8(d) applies to Giglio impeachment material in the same way that it applies to information that “tends to negate the guilt of the accused.” In my view, it does, although I recognize that the ABA opinion does not expressly say yes or no, nor does it distinguish between Brady and Giglio the way the Court did in Ruiz. The opinion does say, however, that a prosecutor’s ethical disclosure obligations are broader than her Brady disclosure obligations, which would suggest that the ABA did not think that the Ruiz distinction matters in the ethical context.

Perhaps more fundamentally, the opinion’s broad language seems consistent with requiring prosecutorial disclosure of Giglio impeachment. The opinion says that prosecutors must disclose any information favorable to the defense, even if it’s not material to the outcome, and that the defense gets to decide on its utility, particularly in figuring out whether to go to trial, plead guilty, or investigate other evidence. These are precisely the sort of decisions that are made based on impeachment material. The ABA even contemplates the situation where the government wants to withhold the identity of an informant: the opinion says that the government can seek a protective order, not that the government can withhold the information. In sum, it would seem anomalous for the opinion to require such broad disclosure, but then permit a prosecutor to withhold the fact that her main witness is being compensated for his testimony and has lied in previous cases.

Filed Under: Informant Law, Prosecutors, Secrecy

No Special Treatment for Madoff Cooperator

August 24, 2009 by Alexandra Natapoff

The Wall Street Journal Law blog posts here that U.S. District Judge Richard Sullivan has refused to let cooperator Frank DiPascali out on bail, even though DiPascali has pled guilty and is helping the government unravel the Madoff scheme. The reason this is newsworthy is that everyone expects courts to treat cooperators well, even when they’ve committed major crimes (DiPascali’s crimes include helping Madoff, lying under oath to SEC investigators, and forging documents–he faces 125 years in prison). In other words, Judge Sullivan is the exception that illustrates the rule. It is more typical for prosecutors and courts to quietly accommodate cooperators–keeping them out on bail, dropping charges, and even helping them with criminal cases in other jurisdictions. In my view, and as I argue in my book, these commonplace accommodations and the culture of cooperation more generally have skewed the criminal system’s approach to culpability. Offenders are evaluated as much for their usefulness as their wrongdoing, and even the most heinous crimes have become opportunities for negotiation. For a haunting example, read this story in the Washington Times entitled Drug Dealer Avoids Jail in Daughter’s Killing, about a drug informant who avoided punishment for the death of his daughter who died of, among other things, a fractured skull and severe malnurishment.

Filed Under: Dynamics of Snitching, News Stories, White Collar

Police Internally Split on Confidentiality Issue

August 19, 2009 by Alexandra Natapoff

Thanks to Scott Henson from Grits For Breakfast for passing along this important story on a battle raging within the St. Louis police department. Rank-and-file police are refusing to provide information about their snitches to their own police supervisors and city police officials. Here’s an excerpt:

Worried about liars in their ranks, city police officials are demanding that up to 20 officers tell bosses details about their confidential informers. But the St. Louis Police Officers Association has won a temporary restraining order to block the inquiry, pending a hearing in court next week. The organization says the probe would jeopardize informers’ lives, officers’ careers and public safety. At issue is whether officers have attributed fabricated information to confidential informers to obtain search and arrest warrants. Police brass acknowledge in court filings that they believe “one or more” officers “have included false information in affidavits” for warrants, and say the investigation is aimed at stopping “the concerns of police abuse and violation of civil rights.”

Ironically, one of the officers’ arguments against holding a public hearing is that if informants are called to testify, they will lie. These being the very same informants that police rely on to get the warrants in the first place.

The fact that street cops are at odds with their own police officials on this question reveals some deep dynamics about snitching, including what I call the culture of secrecy surrounding the entire practice. Police and their informants are heavily dependent on one another–police need information while offenders need protection against punishment. Police will often go a long way to protect their sources, famously from defendants and courts, but often from prosecutors and even sometimes from their own police supervisors. This does not mean that police handlers are necessarily corrupt: handling criminal informants inherently means doing unsavory things like ignoring their crimes, bending the rules, sometimes providing addicts with cash for drugs. However, the culture of secrecy makes illegal police conduct that much easier. See this NYT story on Brooklyn police who supplied their informants with drugs. Kudos to the St. Louis police officials who are trying to make the process more accountable and transparent.

Filed Under: Drug-related, Dynamics of Snitching, News Stories, Police, Secrecy

Thank You to Other Bloggers

August 19, 2009 by Alexandra Natapoff

Snitching Blog has gotten some wonderful “welcome to the neighborhood” posts on other blogs. My thanks to Change.org, Grits for Breakfast, Hit and Run, Sentencing Law and Policy, and TalkLeft.

Filed Under: Uncategorized

Committing Crime While Working for the Government

August 18, 2009 by Alexandra Natapoff

TalkLeft picked up on this story about a Secret Service informant who, while assisting the government, launched one of the largest identity theft operations in U.S. history. Back in 2003, Albert Gonzalez avoided indictment for identity fraud by becoming a snitch; his cooperation resulted in the dismantling of a significant identity theft ring of which he appeared to be the ringleader. He kept on with his criminal activities, however, apparently even using his government connections to warn other hackers.

This is simply one of the biggest problems with informant use: the fact that offenders can use active cooperation not only to avoid punishment but to continue offending. It is a problem inherent in snitching: the most useful informants are typically the most active criminals, so the government has to tolerate some amount of criminality in exchange for information about and access to criminal activities. The scale of the phenomenon ranges: from the small (addicts who stay on the street by providing information to police) to the large (drug dealers who remain in operation by informing on colleagues and competitors) to the mind-boggling (terrorists who provide information to the U.S. government while participating in new terrorist activities). In my book I write extensively about the harm that this practice can cause in high-crime urban communities in particular. When law enforcement tolerates crimes committed by cooperating offenders, whether it is drug use, property crimes, or violence, the neighborhoods in which those offenders live have to put up with it.

Filed Under: Dynamics of Snitching, Informant Crime, White Collar

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