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Incentives & Payments

Harris County, TX offering jailhouse snitches $5000

January 12, 2011 by Alexandra Natapoff

More Texas news. The Harris County jail has a new “Crime Stoppers” program aimed at inmates who call in information, offering rewards of up to $5,000. Houston Chronicle story here: Jailhouse informers: Inmates can offer tips, get paid. County Sheriff Adrian Garcia explains the idea:

“When people are coming into the jail environment, we recognize they’re vulnerable,” Garcia said. “They’re caught and being processed. We wanted to take advantage of that psychology. If they are the only one caught and they’ve been involved in a crime someone else planned, it may be a good idea for them to speak up.”

While the idea of extending Crime Stoppers to criminals might seem logical, Grits for Breakfast points out some challenges:

One critical difference between jailhouse snitches and others who call Crime Stoppers, though: While an arrest may be made or criminal charges filed based on testimony from a jailhouse informant, in 2009 the Texas Legislature, in a bill authored by state Sen. Juan “Chuy” Hinojosa, required corroboration for jailhouse snitches’ testimony in order to secure a conviction. Another difference: Jail calls are never anonymous.

The oddest aspect of the new program is that it completely ignores the well-documented tendency of jailhouse snitches to lie in exchange for benefits. From the Los Angeles Grand Jury investigation to the Canadian Kaufman inquiry, the Illinois Commission on the death penalty, and the California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice report, numerous official studies have documented the pervasive use of snitches in U.S. jails and the potent dangers of wrongful conviction that flow from doing so. See for example, The Snitch System Report by Northwestern University Law School, concluding that criminal snitches constitute the “leading cause of wrongful convictions in U.S. capital cases.” It is thus hard to see how Crime Stoppers’ executive director Katherine Cabannis can say that “she believes the program will be successful because it solicits crime information from an untapped population” or how it can be that District Attorney Pat Lykos “sees no potential downsides.” Indeed, jailhouse snitch testimony is so infamously unreliable that it compelled Texas to enact its corroboration requirement, which I applauded here: Texas requires corroboration for jailhouse snitches. While the corroboration requirement should mitigate some of the dangers of Harris County’s new reward program, in this day and age government officials should think long and hard before creating new incentives for jailhouse informants.

Filed Under: Incentives & Payments, Jailhouse Informants

FOX on the informant market

November 23, 2010 by Alexandra Natapoff

Here’s a general story that ran yesterday on FOX in Memphis, Tennessee– Informants Cashing in on Snitching. The piece focuses on informants, particularly drug informants, who earn money as well as leniency for their own offenses, and it highlights the informality and lack of rules that characterize the world of paid criminal snitching. From the story:

“Most of the informants we develop, are involved in criminal activity. You get your best information from people who have knowledge of the crimes or are being involved in committing the crimes,” said [Sgt. Clay] Aitken [of the Shelby County Sheriff’s Office.] Records on the number of informants and what they’re paid is not made public by the sheriff’s office. Aitken says informants are paid with seized drug money, not taxpayers’ dollars. “I’ve seen informants get paid anywhere from $50 to thousands of dollars. But there’s no set rate or set fee,” said Aitken.

One of [the reporter’s] law enforcement sources who has worked directly with informants, says he’s personally seen a Mid-South informant get handed $50,000 cash for one tip that led to a huge drug bust but that’s nothing compared to what the Feds can offer and he says informants have been known to shop their information around selling it to the highest bidder.

Filed Under: Drug-related, Dynamics of Snitching, Incentives & Payments

Massachusetts Supreme Court disapproves of prosecutorial rewards to witnesses

October 5, 2010 by Alexandra Natapoff

Two witnesses in Wayne Miranda’s murder trial received $2000 each from the Chamber of Commerce because their testimony assisted in producing a guilty verdict. As the Boston Globe writes, the Massachusetts Supreme Court, while approving such witness reward programs generally, has ruled that prosecutors cannot participate in them or help witnesses get rewards when those rewards are contingent on convictions. Commonwealth v. Wayne Miranda, SJC-10568. From the Court’s opinion:

We recognize that, to prove the crime charged, prosecutors often need to procure the cooperation and truthful information or testimony of reluctant witnesses. The interests of justice, however, are not well served when a witness’s reward is contingent on the conviction of a defendant, rather than the provision of truthful information or testimony.

While the Massachusetts Supreme Court should be lauded for its ethical concern, its decision is somewhat ironic. Prosecutors routinely provide far greater benefits to criminal informant witnesses, in the form of liberty and leniency, than a few thousand dollars. In many jurisdictions, these rewards can be contigent on conviction. And even when the rewards are not expressly contingent on conviction, every attorney and informant knows that a witness in a successful conviction is more likely to get rewarded.
This is why Professor George Harris [author of Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 Pepp. L. Rev. 1 (2000)], and I have recommended leveling the playing field by creating defense informants, i.e. rewards for informants who come forward with information that might help the defense rather than the prosecution. As it currently stands, an offender with information helpful to the defense cannot expect any benefits–only the government can give those. This lopsided arrangement is, as the Massachusetts Supreme Court pointed out, not in the interests of accuracy or justice.

Filed Under: Incentives & Payments, Informant Law, Prosecutors

What goes around: violent snitch sentenced for shooting witness

September 30, 2010 by Alexandra Natapoff

When someone is a “longtime police informant,” as the Seattle Post Intelligencer described Devaughn Dorsey, it means that person has had a long-term relationship with police and/or prosecutors in which the government has ignored his crimes, or lessened his punishment, in exchange for information. When that person also happens to be “one of Seattle’s most violent criminals . . . [who] has shot no fewer than eight people since 1990,” it illustrates the most troubling aspect of criminal informant use–that the government is tolerating crime from its information sources in pursuit of new cases. See this previous post —Violent robber-snitch formed new home invasion gang–discussing the dilemma of informants who continue to commit crime while working for the government.

Filed Under: Dynamics of Snitching, Incentives & Payments, Informant Crime

Informant lawsuit against FBI offers window into messy world of anti-terrorism

August 13, 2010 by Alexandra Natapoff

By the end of his stint working for the FBI, informant Craig Monteilh was earning over $11,000 a month to secretly film and record worshippers at the Islamic Center of Irvine, California. Monteilh, who has a lengthy rap sheet of his own, is now suing the FBI for allegedly instructing him to plead guilty to criminal charges of grand theft so as to maintain his cover. The Associated Press report on Monteilh’s lawsuit reveals details of the informant’s world that the public rarely gets to see, particularly the government’s ability to use private individuals/informants to obtain information that the government would otherwise need evidence of wrongdoing and a warrant to obtain: US Judge gives informant time to amend FBI lawsuit. From the story:

In court papers and his ACLU declaration, Monteilh says he was asked to work as an informant for local law enforcement in 2004, when he became friendly with some police officers in a local gym. By 2006, he was promoted to the FBI’s counterterrorism operations. Monteilh alleges he gathered phone numbers and contact information for hundreds of Muslim-Americans and recorded thousands of hours of conversation using a device on his key fob or cell phone during his stint with the FBI. His said his handlers told him to work out with Muslims at gyms, asked him to get codes for security systems so they could enter mosques at night and encouraged him to ask mosque members about “jihad” and supporting terrorist operations abroad. In June 2007, however, mosque members became suspicious of Monteilh and requested a restraining order, saying that he had spoken repeatedly about engaging in jihad.

Filed Under: Dynamics of Snitching, Incentives & Payments, Terrorism

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