Snitching

Criminal Informant Law, Policy, and Research

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Attorney General Holder memo on prosecutorial charging decisions

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Thanks to Sentencing Law and Policy for making Attorney General Eric Holder’s new charging policy memo available here. The blog discusses reactions to Holder’s new guidelines, which are described as providing more flexibility to prosecutors not to argue for mandatory minimum sentences. Of note for this blog’s purposes, Holder’s memo reiterates DOJ’s practice of considering a defendant’s cooperation during the initial charging decision. As the memo states: “In all cases, the charges should fairly represent the defendant’s criminal conduct, and due consideration should be given to the defendant’s substantial assistance in an investigation or prosecution.” As I’ve argued elsewhere, this practice of charge reduction for cooperation is central to the pervasiveness and secrecy of the snitching process: a cooperating suspect will be charged differently, or perhaps not at all, in ways that may leave no paper trail. The U.S. Sentencing Commission keeps track of cooperation departures at sentencing, but charging decisions take place long before a defendant ever comes before a judge to be sentenced.

One consequence of this practice is that cooperation has become a large source of sentencing disparity, the very problem the Sentencing Guidelines were designed to alleviate. For example, an article in the June edition of Justice Quarterly concludes that substantial assistance downward departures are a significant source of inter-judge disparity: “the sentencing discounts that similarly situated defendants get for providing substantial assistance vary upon the judge handling the case,” making substantial assistance departure decisions “a wellspring of sentencing disparity.” Amy Anderson & Cassia Spohn, Lawlessness in the Federal Sentencing Process: A Test for Uniformity and Consistency in Sentence Outcomes, 27 Justice Quarterly 362 (2010). An earlier Sentencing Commission study found that prosecutorial offices reward cooperation very differently as well. In other words, the uniformity offered by determinate sentencing schemes–treating similarly situated offenders similarly– does not cure the significant disparities introduced by unregulated cooperation.

Cycling world grapples with “snitching”

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Lest you think that “stop snitching” is confined to inner-city neighborhoods plagued by drug violence, check out this San Diego Union Tribune story, “Whistle Blower or Snitch?”, in which the sports world reacts to Floyd Landis’s doping allegations against other cyclists. The New York Times a few days ago reported that Landis “has agreed to cooperate with authorities in the United States.” The debate is raging over whether Landis did a good thing (exposed illegal doping) or a shabby thing (sold out his colleagues to evade responsibility for his own wrongdoing).

Although criminal charges have not been filed against Landis, he may still benefit in that regard. Offenders routinely cooperate in order to stave off criminal charges. Indeed, according to renowned white collar defense attorney Kenneth Mann, one of the biggest benefits of cooperation is the ability to shape the pre-indictment process. Landis’s new status as potential witness rather than target may be one of his biggest gains.

Shooting victim testifies in Philly

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A shooting victim’s willingness to testify against the drug dealer who shot him is big news in Philadelphia: Inquirer story here–Despite Threats, Victim Testifies in Phila. Court. That such testimony is perceived as rare (and courageous) reflects the widespread violent witness intimidation suffered by Philly urban residents, and documented in this Inquirer series: Witness Intimidation Crisis. As I’ve written elsewhere, witness intimidation is most pernicious when the threatened fear that the government won’t protect them. That’s why these legislative efforts to improve state witness protection programs are so important.

Do jurors ignore informant rewards?

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One of the central justifications for the use of compensated criminal witnesses is the idea that juries can evaluate informant credibility in ways that lead to fair and reliable outcomes. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that rewarding criminals for testimony is constitutional, relying in part on the procedural protections of discovery, cross-examination, and jury instructions. The idea is that the government can constitutionally reward its witnesses as long as the defense knows about it and the jury is properly instructed.

Recent psychological research throws some doubt on this idea. Dr. Jeff Neuschatz and a number of other psychologists published the following paper: The Effects of Accomplice Witnesses and Jailhouse Informants on Jury Decision Making, Law & Human Behavior 32 (2008): 137-149. They concluded that jurors who were told that a witness was getting a deal (and therefore had an incentive to lie) were just as likely to convict as jurors who didn’t know that the witness was being compensated. Moreover, the bare fact that an informant said there was a confession made the jury more likely to convict. From the article:

First, both college and community samples demonstrated that conviction rates were unaffected by the explicit provision of information indicating that the witness received an incentive to testify. Second, and consistent with the research on confession evidence in the courtroom, the presence of a confession, albeit a secondary confession, had a significant influence on mock juror conviction rates. More specifically, in every witness typeand across both college and community samples, mock jurors convicted significantly more often when there was a secondary confession provided by a cooperating witness than when no such witness had testified….

Even though the witness in the incentive condition had an enormous motivation to fabricate evidence (having been provided a situational incentive to testify), jurors appeared to ignore this information and render verdicts that were not significantly different across the Incentive and No Incentive conditions. The participants may not have recognized or considered the impact that an incentive might have on behavior and/or the willingness to provide accurate and truthful information. Furthermore, participants did not have significantly different ratings of truthfulness or trustworthiness across the Incentive and No Incentive conditions.

This is an important finding. The system assumes that jurors who are told that an informant is getting a deal will be less likely to believe the informant and less likely to convict. This study suggests not only that this isn’t so, but that just having a criminal informant testify to a confession significantly enhances the likelihood of a conviction.

Primetime: U.S. customs authorizes informant to import cocaine

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Another large-scale informant crime spree, this one courtesy of a Grits comment. In this story, ABC News Primetime documented how U.S. Customs authorized its informant, Rodney Matthews, to import tons of cocaine into the U.S., much of which ended up on the streets. Here’s the link to the Primetime transcript. Caught with a few hundred pounds of marijuana, Matthews became a Customs informant and starting importing cocaine with the government’s blessing. While all the Customs officials interviewed acknowledged that such deals are routine, they disputed whether the drugs were permitted by the government to hit the streets: Agent Tom Grieve said it wasn’t authorized, while Mark Conrad of Customs internal affairs concluded that Grieve was lying to cover up the debacle. From the transcript:

FORREST SAWYER (Primetime) Was there anything said, anything that could have been in your wildest imagination misinterpreted to mean that Rodney Matthews could bring in a load and let it hit the streets?

AGENT TOM GRIEVE No. Not hit the streets. No, no, no, no. No. See, that’s-no, no.

FORREST SAWYER Tom Grieve says that there was no carte blanche, nothing like carte blanche.

MARK CONRAD, US CUSTOMS INTERNAL AFFAIRS Tom Grieve is simply a liar.

FORREST SAWYER ( VO ) Mark Conrad runs internal affairs for Customs in Houston. A 27-year veteran, Conrad spoke to PrimeTime in New York over the objections of the Customs Service.

MARK CONRAD We got in bed with Rodney Matthews and the importation of a humongous amount of narcotics coming into the United States.

FORREST SAWYER And the reason wasn’t because they were dirty?

MARK CONRAD No. The reason is there’s a great deal of pressure on agents in the field to make cases, to make the big one. And the bigger, the better.

FORREST SAWYER ( VO ) In fact, more than a dozen agents and former drug enforcement officials told us that letting dope hit the streets is the cost of doing business, that while the Matthews case is extreme, it’s just the tip of the iceberg.

Matthews’ former partner Jimmy Ellard got an even more dramatic deal. He had fled to Colombia and became a top transporter for drug kingpin Pablo Escobar. When he was caught in Florida, Ellard pled guilty to importing $6 billion [sic] worth of drugs into the U.S., and orchestrating a fatal airplane bombing. Ellard earned leniency by accusing several Customs officials of corruption. The officials were exonerated; Ellard served only six years in prison.