Snitching

Criminal Informant Law, Policy, and Research

Alexandra Natapoff

Violent FBI informant infiltrates Denver’s racial justice movement

by

From Trevor Aaronson at the Intercept, this profile of an informant used by the FBI to infiltrate, record, provide weapons to, and incite violence by Black activists in Denver: The Snitch in the Silver Hearse. Michael Windecker — who had prior convictions for sexual assault of a 14-year-old girl and weapons charges — was paid over $20,000 during the summer of 2020 at the height of Denver protests against the killings of George Floyd and Elijah McClain. Among other astounding things, Windecker drove an activist to the personal home of Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser (who was overseeing the prosecution of the police and paramedics who killed McClain) where Windecker affirmatively encouraged the activist to kill Weiser. The activist refused.

The FBI has a long sordid history of using informants to infiltrate and disrupt progressive political groups. See previous posts here. For more history, see Elizabeth Hinton, The Unsettling Message of Judas and the Black Messiah in The Atlantic, and Gary Marx’s classic book, Undercover.

Hawaii wrongful conviction used snitches to bolster weak DNA evidence

by

Albert “Ian” Schweitzer spent 25 years in prison for a murder he did not commit, based on faulty DNA testing and two different lying informants–one drug defendant and one jailhouse informant. The first informant received probation instead of significant jailtime and avoided federal prosecution. The jailhouse snitch avoided retrial and a potential 10-year sentence. Story from the Hawaii Innocence Project here: Ian Schweitzer Exonerated of Murder After 25 Years in Hawaii. Thanks to Radley Balko’s The Watch for highlighting the story.

The case is an example of a larger forensic problem. Jailhouse snitch testimony often comes into existence in order to bolster weak cases. High profile murders tend to generate snitch testimony since informants know that rewards are forthcoming. The problem is worse for weak cases: if the case were strong, the government wouldn’t need the snitch. The confluence creates a pernicious storm of inaccuracy where bad evidence makes other bad evidence look better than it actually is. For more examples see this previous post about dog sniff and arson bolstering.

FBI Agent reveals illegal informant tactics in the domestic war on terror

by

Informants are central to and embedded in numerous larger law enforcement programs. The New York Times Magazine published this profile of FBI agent Terry Albury who, among other things, pushed back against the FBI’s coercive development of informants in pursuit of baseless counterterrorism investigations, as well as racial and religious profiling. Albury was convicted in 2018 of leaking classified documents to journalists; he was sentenced to four years in prison. From the article, “I Helped Destroy People“:

“Assessments were the opening salvo to the informant-recruitment process. It was a delicate art of manipulation, persuading a person to work for the federal government against his or her own community, but with access to the person’s criminal history, or immigration status, it was much easier. There were different techniques agents were allowed to use. They could assist a person who lacked legal status to be given it, a tactic known as the “immigration-relief dangle.” Conversely, agents could also work with immigration officials to deport those people if and when they’d exhausted their usefulness as confidential sources. Fear was a prominent driver. . . . Another approach was to threaten uncooperative sources with spreading disinformation unless they agreed to cooperate. “The script was, ‘Everyone in your community already thinks you’re a source, so you might as well work with us.'” “