• Skip to primary navigation
  • Skip to main content

Snitching

Criminal Informant Law, Policy, and Research

  • Home
  • About
  • Litigation
  • Legislation
  • Families & Youth
  • Blog
  • Resources & Scholarship

Alexandra Natapoff

Massachusetts Supreme Court disapproves of prosecutorial rewards to witnesses

October 5, 2010 by Alexandra Natapoff

Two witnesses in Wayne Miranda’s murder trial received $2000 each from the Chamber of Commerce because their testimony assisted in producing a guilty verdict. As the Boston Globe writes, the Massachusetts Supreme Court, while approving such witness reward programs generally, has ruled that prosecutors cannot participate in them or help witnesses get rewards when those rewards are contingent on convictions. Commonwealth v. Wayne Miranda, SJC-10568. From the Court’s opinion:

We recognize that, to prove the crime charged, prosecutors often need to procure the cooperation and truthful information or testimony of reluctant witnesses. The interests of justice, however, are not well served when a witness’s reward is contingent on the conviction of a defendant, rather than the provision of truthful information or testimony.

While the Massachusetts Supreme Court should be lauded for its ethical concern, its decision is somewhat ironic. Prosecutors routinely provide far greater benefits to criminal informant witnesses, in the form of liberty and leniency, than a few thousand dollars. In many jurisdictions, these rewards can be contigent on conviction. And even when the rewards are not expressly contingent on conviction, every attorney and informant knows that a witness in a successful conviction is more likely to get rewarded.
This is why Professor George Harris [author of Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 Pepp. L. Rev. 1 (2000)], and I have recommended leveling the playing field by creating defense informants, i.e. rewards for informants who come forward with information that might help the defense rather than the prosecution. As it currently stands, an offender with information helpful to the defense cannot expect any benefits–only the government can give those. This lopsided arrangement is, as the Massachusetts Supreme Court pointed out, not in the interests of accuracy or justice.

Filed Under: Incentives & Payments, Informant Law, Prosecutors

Texas requires corroboration for informant witnesses

October 4, 2010 by Alexandra Natapoff

Perhaps as a result of these sorts of debacles, Infamous fake drug scandal in Dallas, Of Experts and Snitches, Texas has passed some good corroboration legislation restricting the use of drug informants and jailhouse snitches. Last year, it passed this law requiring corroboration for jailhouse snitches:

A defendant may not be convicted of an offense on the testimony of a person to whom the defendant made a statement against the defendant’s interest during a time when the person was imprisoned or confined in the same correctional facility as the defendant unless the testimony is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed. Tex. Code. Crim. Pro. art. 38-075

Article 38-141 similarly requires corroboration before a drug informant can testify. These are steps in the right direction, although they are only partial solutions to the lying snitch problem. The key to informant unreliability is not whether the informant is involved in drugs or in jail, but whether he expects a benefit and therefore has a motivation to lie. Nebraska takes the right approach in this regard by defining “informant” to include “any criminal suspect, whether or not he is detained or incarcerated, who received a deal, promise, inducement or benefit.” Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-1929. In defining informant broadly, the Nebraska legislature reasoned that “there is a compelling state interest in providing safeguards against the admission of testimony the reliability of which may be or has been compromised through improper inducements.”

Filed Under: Drug-related, Informant Law, Jailhouse Informants, Legislation

Welcome to Professor Eric Miller

October 3, 2010 by Alexandra Natapoff

I’m so pleased to introduce guest blogger Professor Eric Miller, from St. Louis University School of Law. His scholarship focuses on policing, race, and drug enforcement–key issues in the informant policy world. Readers may be particularly interested in this piece: Role-Based Policing: Restraining Police Conduct “Outside the Legitimate Investigative Sphere,” 94 Cal. L. Rev. 617 (2006), in which Professor Miller thinks about the many informal ways that police interact with suspects and citizens. He’ll be with us for October.

Filed Under: Guest blogger

A rare rebuke to the government

October 1, 2010 by Alexandra Natapoff

Today’s New York Times opines about the FBI’s sordid 15-year history of covering up for two of its top informants, James “Whitey” Bulger and Stephen “the Rifleman” Flemmi. The government’s mishandling of these two seasoned criminals has generated numerous criminal cases, law suits, and a scathing 2004 Congressional inquiry entitled “Everything Secret Degenerates: The FBI’s Use of Murderers as Informants.” In this latest episode, last week Judge William Young ordered the U.S. Department of Justice to compensate the families of two Flemmi/Bulger murder victims because of how government lawyers had “bullied and maligned” the families during litigation.

Filed Under: News Stories

What goes around: violent snitch sentenced for shooting witness

September 30, 2010 by Alexandra Natapoff

When someone is a “longtime police informant,” as the Seattle Post Intelligencer described Devaughn Dorsey, it means that person has had a long-term relationship with police and/or prosecutors in which the government has ignored his crimes, or lessened his punishment, in exchange for information. When that person also happens to be “one of Seattle’s most violent criminals . . . [who] has shot no fewer than eight people since 1990,” it illustrates the most troubling aspect of criminal informant use–that the government is tolerating crime from its information sources in pursuit of new cases. See this previous post —Violent robber-snitch formed new home invasion gang–discussing the dilemma of informants who continue to commit crime while working for the government.

Filed Under: Dynamics of Snitching, Incentives & Payments, Informant Crime

  • « Go to Previous Page
  • Go to page 1
  • Interim pages omitted …
  • Go to page 40
  • Go to page 41
  • Go to page 42
  • Go to page 43
  • Go to page 44
  • Interim pages omitted …
  • Go to page 61
  • Go to Next Page »

Copyright © 2026 Alexandra Natapoff · Log in · RSS on follow.it