Snitching

Criminal Informant Law, Policy, and Research

Alexandra Natapoff

San Francisco to review snitch policy

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The San Francisco police department has announced that it is reviewing its use of criminal informants and will provide additional training to officers. The decision comes in the wake of allegations of misconduct against several officers. From the SF Examiner story:

Last Thursday, the day after allegations of illegal searches and seizures against six officers were made public and as gang tensions mounted in the Mission district, police station captains received a message on their department BlackBerrys to stop using confidential sources — known on the street as snitches — until further notice.

The directive came from the head of investigations, Cmdr. David Lazar, and was rescinded within an hour, according to interim police Chief Jeff Godown.

“It was an error,” he said. Lazar also acknowledged the mistake, calling it a “premature blast out.”

But before the order could be reversed, complaints rained down from captains. Capt. Greg Corrales was trying to stop retaliatory gang warfare in the Mission when the order came in. It would have made police work nearly impossible, Corrales said. The department announced that it will review its use of confidential informants this week and officers will receive additional training. . . . “Confidential informants are done on a daily basis and there are administrative issues,” Godown said. “We started looking into this months ago.”

Informant policies are often intimately associated with police misconduct, in part because informant use is secretive and easily subject to abuse. In the Los Angeles Rampart scandal, for example, police used informants to plant evidence and cover up police shootings. Part of the post-Rampart reform involved curtailing informant use by street officers. See Los Angeles Times story here: LAPD Eases Rules on Street Sources.

New article: “The Terrorist Informant”

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There is increasing public and media interest in the government’s use of terrorism informants, particularly with respect to issues of entrapment, and the impact on Muslim American communities. Professor Wadie Said at the University of South Carolina Law School has just published this article: The Terrorist Informant, 85 Washington Law Review 687 (2010), on this important subject. Here is the summary:

A man sets himself on fire in front of the White House in a dispute with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). He has been working as an informant for the FBI in a high-profile terrorism prosecution and is unhappy with the $100,000 he has been paid so far. He has also been recently convicted of bank fraud. As a result, the government declines to call him as a witness, given the damage his actions have on his credibility and trustworthiness. This incident underscores the difficulty inherent in relying on paid informants to drive a prosecution, where material considerations such as money and legal assistance are often the price the government pays for an informant’s services. In the years since September 11, 2001, informants have been at the heart of many major terrorism prosecutions. The entrapment defense, perhaps the only legal tool available to defendants in such prosecutions, has proven ineffective. This is evident when one considers the context of generally heightened suspicion of the Arab and Muslim communities in the United States. Further, a closer look at several of these prosecutions reveals repeated instances of suggestive and provocative activity by informants geared at obtaining a conviction, calling into question whether a genuine threat to U.S. national security actually existed in the first place. This Article argues that the government should cease its current practice of using informants to generate terrorism prosecutions.

“Secret Justice” article

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Here’s an article I wrote for Prison Legal News entitled “Secret Justice: Criminal Informants and America’s Underground Legal System.” The article is a brief overview of many of the themes I cover in the book–here’s the first paragraph:

Although it is almost invisible to the public, the use of criminal informants is everywhere in the U.S. justice system. From street corners to jails to courthouses to prisons, every year the government negotiates thousands of deals with criminal offenders in which suspects can avoid arrest or punishment in exchange for information. These deals typically take place off-the-record, subject to few rules and little oversight. While criminal informants-sometimes referred to as “snitches”-can be important investigative tools, using them has some serious costs: informants often continue to commit crimes, while the information they provide is infamously unreliable. Taken together, these facts make snitching an important and problematic aspect of the way America does justice.

Julius and Ethel Rosenberg: punished for not snitching?

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In this month’s edition of the Monthly Review, Staughton Lynd offers this meditation on the famous Rosenbergs: Is There Anything More to Say about the Rosenberg Case? Lynd, himself a well-known anti-Vietnam War activist, quaker, historian, and attorney, argues that the Rosenbergs were executed in 1953 not so much for being part of a Russian spy ring, but because they–unlike other members of the ring–refused to give information to the govenment. From the article:

We should ask, “Why were the Rosenbergs punished so much more severely than others whose activities were comparable to theirs?” I believe Haynes and Klehr provide the answer. Each individual who “confessed” was required to do one thing more. He or she was also asked to identify (“finger”) other individuals engaged in espionage. Thus, “Fuchs’ confession in Britain led the FBI to Harry Gold in the United States. Gold’s confession in turn…quickly led the FBI to Sgt. David Greenglass. Greenglass confessed to espionage and also implicated his wife, Ruth, and his brother-in-law, Julius Rosenberg.” But, at this point, the FBI inquiry hit a snag, or what Haynes and Klehr call “stonewalling” by the Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell. That is to say, these three persons refused to snitch. …

I offer the opinion that the Rosenbergs’ execution was really all about their refusal to snitch. On the basis of a fifteen-year acquaintance with death row prisoners in Ohio, I can state that the refusal to snitch is one of the highest values of long-term prisoners. It is the essence of the “convict code.” Refusal to snitch earns a prisoner recognition as a “solid convict.” In contrast, the government wanted an unbroken chain of informants who would inform against their colleagues. When confronted by individuals who refused to confess or “deal,” the government decided to send a message to all other potential informants by killing the Rosenbergs.

‘Stop Snitching’ in the UK

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Since we have a guest from the UK, this story seemed particularly timely. A ‘stop snitching’ pamphlet was distributed in a largely black London housing project after a murder. The event has triggered a debate very similar to the debate in the U.S. over police-community relations. From the BBC story: Peckham murder ‘snitch’ leaflet: what has changed?:

“No one likes a rat,” the pamphlets stated. “Remember the police are not your friend. Don’t be deceived by promises of anonymity, protection and rewards. They will say and do anything to make you snitch, then destroy your life.” It concluded: “Be smart. Don’t snitch.” The flyers were linked to a website, entitled ‘Stop Snitching’. It is unclear whether the site is linked to a campaign of the same name launched in 2004, in the troubled US city of Baltimore. …

Claudia Webbe, chairwoman of the public panel set up to scrutinise the police’s work, said: “People on the estate were very angry and defiant after the leaflets – but for some it added to the fear. It tapped into suspicions some have long believed.” One Southwark councillor has claimed that the leaflets actually had the effect of increasing the number of calls to police – something the Metropolitan Police is yet to comment on. And Ms Webbe thinks the estate’s reaction since the leafleting campaign is symptomatic of how relationships between police and the black community have improved. She said: “In 1998 not a single person would have spoken to police after a murder like this.”